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Abstract: 
Probabilistic quantum non-demolition (QND) measurements can be performed using 
linear optics and post-selection.  Here we show how QND devices of this kind can be 
used in a straightforward way to implement a quantum relay, which is capable of 
extending the range of a quantum cryptography system by suppressing the effects of 
detector noise.  Unlike a quantum repeater, a quantum relay system does not require 
entanglement purification or the ability to store photons. 
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 Probabilistic quantum logic operations can be implemented using linear optical 
elements, additional photons (ancilla), and post-selection [1,2].  We have proposed [3] 
and experimentally demonstrated [4,5] several logic devices of this kind that succeed 
with an ideal probability of ½, while the probability of success can be made arbitrarily 
high using larger numbers of ancilla [6].  Here we show that probabilistic quantum non-
demolition (QND) measurements [7,8] based on these techniques can be used to 
implement a quantum relay that can extend the throughput and maximum range of a 
quantum cryptography system by suppressing the noise due to detector dark counts.  
Unlike a quantum repeater [9], a quantum relay does not require entanglement 
purification [10] or the ability to store photons. 
 The specific QND implementation that we present here is a modification of a 
probabilistic quantum encoder circuit [3]; however, the results of our relay analysis are 
applicable to other QND implementations as well [8].  As shown in Fig. 1, the encoder 
circuit conditionally encodes (copies) the state of an input qubit into two output qubits.  
As will be shown below, the addition of a second detector can be used to signal the 
presence of an input photon while the polarization state of the input qubit is transferred 
into the remaining output.  As Kok, Lee, and Dowling [8] recently pointed out, quantum 
teleportation [11] can be used to implement QND measurements; accordingly, Fig. 1 can 
be seen to be a teleportation-based QND device using the Bell-state measurement 
approach of Pan and Zeilinger [12].   
 We begin by describing the operation of the quantum encoder and its modification 
to perform QND measurements.  The concept of a quantum relay is then introduced, in 
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which each segment of a communications channel conditionally passes (relays) a qubit on 
to the next segment of the communications channel provided that a QND measurement 
has verified that a photon is actually present.  This does not avoid the exponential loss of 
signal in an optical fiber, but the limiting effects of detector dark counts on error 
correction and privacy amplification can be essentially eliminated.  The performance of 
such a quantum relay is then analyzed in terms of its potential for increased throughput 
and operating range.    
As shown in Fig. 1, the QND measurement of interest here is implemented using 
polarizing beam splitters.  Its intended function is to produce a classical output signal if 
one and only one photon is present in the input, while transferring the polarization state 
of the incident qubit to the output mode.  The output of the QND measurement is known 
to be correct whenever one and only one photon is detected in each detector assembly, 
which occurs with a probability of ½. 
The notation used here is the same as in our earlier paper on quantum logic 
operations [3].  Qubit values 0 and 1 ( 0  and 1 ) are represented by the horizontal and 
vertical polarization modes ( H  and V ) of single photons.  The input qubit is assumed 
to be in an arbitrary superposition state given by 
0 0 0
H V≡ +ψ α β , where α  and β  
are complex coefficients. 
The intended function of the encoder circuit is to perform the transformation 
0 0 1 2 1 2
H V H H V Vα β α β+ → +    (1) 
As shown in Fig. 1, this can be accomplished by using a polarizing beam splitter to mix 
the input mode (0) with one photon (a) that is part of a pair of entangled ancilla photons 
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emitted by φ+ into modes a and 1.  The output modes (1 and 2) are conditionally accepted 
if a polarization-sensitive detector package Db (shown in the inset of Fig. 1) records one-
and-only-one (1AO1) event.  The detector package Db consists of a polarizing beam 
splitter rotated 45° from the HV basis, followed by two ordinary single-photon detectors; 
the axes of the rotated basis will be referred to as F and S: 
 [ ]1
2
F H V≡ +  (2) 
 [ ]1
2
S H V≡ −  (3) 
 
 Here the ket notation has been dropped for compactness.  The 1AO1 condition signals 
the successful projection of the combined state onto the desired output state, which is the 
origin of the nonlinearity required for logic operations. 
The entangled ancilla photons are created in a Bell state of the form: 
[ ]1 1 112a a aH H V Vφ+ ≡ + .  The state of the system after the polarizing beam splitter can 
be shown to be  
[ ]12 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 112b b b b bH H H VV V V H V H V Hψ α β α β= + + + ,      (4) 
The last two terms in Eq. (4) correspond to zero or two photons going to detector package 
Db, and these terms are therefore projected out of the accepted state (with a probability of 
1/2) by the 1AO1 condition.  The usefulness of the projected state Pψ  becomes apparent 
when it is renormalized and expressed in the FS basis:  
[ ]1 2 1 2 1 2 1 21 ( ) ( )2P b bH H VV F H H VV Sψ α β α β= + + −   (5) 
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It can be seen from Eq. (5) that the quantum encoder performs the desired logic operation 
whenever 1AO1 photon is found in the Fb channel.  In addition, the feed-forward 
quantum control methods that we have recently demonstrated [5] can be used to obtain 
the desired output for Sb detection events by reversing the relative sign of the α  and β  
terms. 
  The encoder circuit can be converted to a QND measurement device by adding a 
second polarization-sensitive detector package D2 that is identical to Db, but located in 
path 2.  If one and only one photon is detected in both detector packages, the projected 
state of the system can be shown to be  
[ ]2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 21 ( ) ( )2P b b b b b b b bH F F S F F S S S V F F S F F S S Sψ α β= + + + + − − +     (6) 
It can be seen that the output state in mode 1 is identical to the input state under these 
conditions, provided that feed-forward techniques [5] are used to reverse the relative sign 
of the α  and β  terms for some of the combinations of Db and D2 detection events, such 
as S2Fb, for example.  The complete circuit probabilistically implements a QND 
measurement on a photon in the sense that a classical signal is generated only when an 
input photon is present without affecting its state of polarization.  This occurs with a 
probability of ½ assuming ideal hardware; the effects of detector noise will be considered 
below. 
 The reason for placing the second detector package in mode 2 instead of mode 1 
can be seen by considering the operation of the device when there is no photon present in 
the input mode.  In that case the joint 1AO1 condition for both detectors cannot be 
fulfilled because only one of the detection packages receives an ancilla photon.  If D2 
were moved to output mode 1 instead, then the device could produce a false gate signal 
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when no photon is present in the input because the two ancilla could trigger both detector 
packages in that case. 
 Having described a specific method for making quantum non-demolition 
measurements with a success probability of 1/2, we now focus on a potential application 
of this type of device in a quantum communications system.  The maximum range of 
current fiber-based quantum cryptography systems is limited by the loss of photons as 
they propagate through an optical fiber combined with the dark counts in the detectors.  
Error correction and privacy amplification [13] become increasingly inefficient as the 
number of remaining photons becomes comparable to the detector dark count, at which 
point the effective throughput of the system rapidly drops to zero.  The range can be 
extended using quantum repeaters [9] based on entanglement swapping [14] or quantum 
teleportation [11], but both of these methods require entanglement purification [10] and 
the ability to store photons for an appreciable time.  In contrast, the quantum relay 
described below can increase the range and total throughput (after error correction and 
privacy amplification) without the need for entanglement purification or photon storage 
because all of the required qubit manipulations are local, i.e. self-contained in the relays.  
Losses in the fiber still occur, but the effects of detector dark counts are suppressed using 
QND measurements, thereby greatly increasing the efficiency of the privacy 
amplification and error correction protocols.  This scheme is somewhat similar to the 
notion of event-ready detection [15]; however, we show that by distributing the relays 
throughout the channel the impact of detector noise, both in the relays and at the receiver, 
can be made negligible.  
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The implementation of a quantum relay system using QND measurements is 
illustrated in Fig. 2.  Each relay Ri performs a quantum non-demolition measurement to 
determine if a photon is present or if it has been lost in transmission through the fiber up 
to that point.  If the photon is still present, a classical gate signal indicating that fact is 
sent on to the next relay along with the photon itself.  If a photon is not detected beyond 
some point in the transmission line, the gating information is used to ignore that event 
and not accept any output from the detectors in the receiver.  As a result, the dark count 
rate in the detector will be greatly reduced and the signal to noise ratio S (number of true 
photon detection events divided by the number of spurious detection events) will be 
increased compared to its value without any relays.  We refer to this system as a quantum 
relay because each node in the system conditionally passes (relays) a qubit on to the next 
node, provided a photon was found to be present. 
It is obviously important to include the effects of detector dark counts in the relay 
elements themselves as well as the probability of ½ for the successful operation of the 
QND measurements.  In fact, one might suspect that the relays would only make the 
situation worse when these factors are taken into account.  However, any spurious 
photons generated by the relays will be attenuated exponentially as they propagate 
through the fiber.  As long as the relay elements are sufficiently far from the receiver, this 
attenuation will cause the contribution from spurious relay photons to be much smaller 
than the dark count in the receiver.  In the same way, the factor of ½ loss associated with 
the probabilistic QND measurements can be much smaller than the inefficiency in error 
correction and privacy amplification that would have occurred without the signal-to-noise 
improvement from a quantum relay. 
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An ideal relay element can be viewed as implementing the following 
transformation on the input density matrix 
1 1
1 0 0 0 (1 )2 2
P PP Pθ θ θ θ+ → + − ∅ ∅      (7) 
Here P1 is the probability that a single photon in the polarization state θ  is present, P0 
denotes the probability that no photon was present, and the state ∅  represents a 
situation in which the absence of a gate signal indicates that no photon was present.  (The 
QND measurement also rejects events in which there was more than one photon in the 
input channel and Eq. (7) could be generalized accordingly.)   If dark counts in the relay 
detectors are included, then the effects of a single relay can be described by 
 1 0 1 10 0 (1 2 )d dP P P P I P Pθ θ η θ θ η+ → + + − − ∅ ∅  (8) 
Here η is a reduced efficiency close to ½ (assuming heralded pairs of ancilla photons), I 
is the identity matrix, and Pd is the probability of a dark count in one of the QND 
detectors during the processing time of a single qubit. The use of the identity matrix in 
Eq. (8) reflects the fact that the spurious photons emitted as a result of detector dark 
counts in the relays have random polarizations.  Since Pd is typically very small (~10-5 for 
a 10 MHz system using commercial single-photon counting modules), we only need to 
consider the probability of a single dark count event occurring in one of the four 
detectors.  Furthermore, since the 1AO1 detection condition correctly excludes half of the 
dark count events (because they occur in the same package as the ancilla detection), the 
probability of a relay error in Eq. (8) is approximately 2 dP  even though four detectors are 
used in each QND device.  This probability of error obviously depends on the specific 
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QND measurement device used, and can be generalized for other implementations 
accordingly. 
Secure communications in a quantum cryptography system is only guaranteed if 
the quantum bit error rate QB is below the error rate that would be produced by an 
eavesdropper, which is 25% for an ideal BB84 [16] implementation.  Since the maximum 
range of current optical fiber systems is primarily determined by the impact of 
exponential photon losses and detector noise on QB, we will assume an otherwise perfect 
system, i.e. no optical misalignments or background light.  A typical BB84 receiver [17] 
utilizes two detectors, so that the probability Pn of a noise event in the receiver is roughly 
twice the detector dark count probability (i.e. Pn ~ 2 Pd) in the limit of small Pd.  (For 
simplicity, we assume that all of the detectors have the same dark count.)  Under these 
assumptions, the quantum bit error rate for a quantum cryptography system with no 
quantum relays is given by 
1
2 1
2(1 )
n
B
n s
PQ
P P S
= =+ +           (9) 
Here Ps is the probability of a signal photon detection and S ≡ Ps/Pn.  The factor of ½ in 
Eq. (9) is due to the fact that half of the dark count events accidentally give the correct 
result.  Including the exponential attenuation in the fiber, the signal to noise ratio of an 
otherwise ideal cryptography system is 
11
0 2
x
dS P e
− −= α           (10) 
Here x is the transmission distance and α is the fiber attenuation parameter, which is 
~0.05/km for a typical optical fiber loss of 0.2dB/km.  From Eq. (9) we see that the 
maximum QB threshold of 25% corresponds to a minimum signal to noise ratio of S=1.   
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 We now consider the potential improvement in the signal to noise ratio if a single 
quantum relay is added to the system at a distance x1 from the transmitter and x2 from the 
receiver, so that x = x1 + x2.  The impact of the relay on the cryptography signal is a 
straightforward reduction in Ps due to the efficiency of the relay, i.e. xsP e
−→ αη .  
Although the relay is designed to reduce noise by gating detector events in the 
cryptography receiver, it also adds noise in the form of randomly polarized photons.  
Since these added noise photons must propagate through the channel to reach the 
receiver, the total noise probability is given by 
22 xn G d RP P P P e
−= + α           (11) 
Here PG is the probability that a gate signal will be produced by the relay and PR =2Pd is 
the probability that a spurious output photon will be produced in the relay itself.  The first 
term in Eq. (11) represents the receiver dark count reduction by a factor of PG, while the 
second term corresponds to the spurious relay photons after attenuation in the fiber.  
Including the attenuation of signal photons in propagating to the relay gives 1−= xGP e αη  
(events with multiple dark counts have been neglected), which reduces Eq. (11) to  
1 22 x xn dP P e e
− − = + α αη .          (12) 
The optimal single-relay position can be found by minimizing Pn, which gives 
( )111 2 [ ]−= + ex x Logα η ; the optimal location is shifted somewhat towards the transmitter 
(the logarithm is negative).  Inserting these values of x1 and x2 into the above equations 
gives a signal to noise ratio S1 that is exponentially better than that from the cryptography 
system alone: 
1
2 21
1 0 2
x
S S e
αη =   .              (13) 
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Although this result may seem surprising, it can be understood from the fact that the 
attenuation of the signal before the relay reduces the probability of a gate signal, which in 
turn reduces the probability of a spurious count in the receiver, while attenuation after the 
relay reduces the effects of spurious photons generated in the relay.   
A similar analysis assuming N relay elements optimally distributed throughout the 
channel results in a maximum signal to noise ratio SN given by 
1 11
0 1
N N
N Nx
N NS S e
αη + ++ =        (14) 
The signal to noise ratio is not overly sensitive to the relay efficiency, even for a large 
number of elements, because the signal and noise are equally reduced by all but one 
relay.  The optimum placement of the relays is uniform throughout the channel with the 
exception of the last relay (nearest the receiver), whose optimal location is given by 
( )11 1 [ ]−+ − eN x N Logα η . 
For comparison, we have performed an exact numerical simulation of a quantum 
cryptography system augmented with quantum relays.  This simulation includes the 
possibility of multiple dark counts that was neglected in the equations above.  The results 
for several values of N are shown in Fig. 3, which indicates good agreement with the 
approximate analytic results presented above.  This plot also suggests that a single 
quantum relay could approximately double the range of a quantum cryptography system. 
The potential range enhancement of a relay system can be estimated by 
considering a system operated at a fixed signal to noise ratio.  By solving Eqs. (10) & 
(14) for the maximum range at a given value of S, we calculate the range enhancement 
ratio R to be 
 12
( 1)
0
[( 1) ]( 1)
[ ]
− ++≡ ≈ +
N
N
N e d
e d
R Log N P SR N
R Log P S
η      (15) 
Although the range enhancement ratio R can be very large, it should be kept in mind that 
a quantum relay does not avoid the loss in signal due to attenuation.  For example, at a 
range where αx=25, the bit rate of a perfect system operating at 100GHz would be ~1 bit 
per second. 
  The potential advantage of a quantum relay system can be put in perspective by 
calculating the overall throughput of a quantum cryptography system including the 
effects of error correction and privacy amplification, for which we used the results of 
Lutkenhaus [18].  Fig. 4 shows the results of such an analysis for up to three relays, 
where the normalized throughput Tn is defined as the total throughput divided by the 
signal rate after attenuation but prior to error correction or privacy amplification.  For a 
quantum cryptography system with no relays (N=0), the figure clearly shows the 
dramatic degradation in throughput as the signal to noise ratio approaches 1, which 
provides an upper bound on the achievable range in that case.  It can be seen that the use 
of quantum relays can postpone this sharp transition, although it should be emphasized 
once again that losses in the fiber still occur and that the throughput still decreases 
exponentially as a result. 
 In summary, we have described the use of probabilistic QND measurements to 
implement a quantum relay that can extend the range and throughput of a quantum 
cryptography system despite the non-deterministic nature of the devices involved.  The 
QND measurements described here can be implemented using polarizing beam splitters, 
post selection, and feed-forward quantum control techniques, with an ideal efficiency of 
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½.  They can be viewed either as a modification of a quantum encoder [3] or as a new 
application of quantum teleportation [8].  Unlike a quantum repeater [9], a quantum relay 
does not require entanglement purification or the ability to store photons.  On the other 
hand, the practical applications of a quantum relay are limited by the fact that it does not 
correct for decoherence of the qubits or the exponential loss of photons in an optical 
fiber.  (Decoherence in quantum cryptography systems is generally quite low and 
fidelities in excess of 0.99 can be obtained using classical feedback techniques [17].) As 
recently noted by Kok, Williams, and Dowling [19], the probabilistic CNOT gates that 
we have described elsewhere [3] could also be used to implement a quantum repeater, 
which would be more challenging but could, at least in principle, compensate for 
decoherence and loss as well.  
 This work was supported by the Office of Naval Research and by IR&D funds. 
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FIG. 1. An implementation of a probabilistic QND measurement of a qubit input in mode 
0 using a probabilistic quantum encoder [3] followed by a polarization-sensitive detector 
in output mode 2.  The inset shows the details of the polarization-sensitive detector 
packages, each of which consists of a polarizing beam splitter rotated through a 45 D  
angle (into the FS basis) followed by two ordinary single-photon detectors.  The device 
can be viewed either as a modification of a quantum encoder circuit [3] or as a new 
application of quantum teleportation [8,12]. 
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FIG. 2. A quantum relay system in which each relay Ri conditionally passes (relays) a 
qubit and a gate signal on to the next element provided a QND measurement indicated 
that a photon was actually present.  The quantum relay suppresses the effects of dark 
counts in the receiver detectors via the gate signal, while spurious photons generated by 
dark counts in the relays themselves are exponentially attenuated by the transmission 
channel before reaching the receiver. 
Transmitter R1 ReceiverR2 RN
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FIG. 3. Plot of the signal to noise ratio S as a function of the range xα  in dimensionless 
units for a quantum cryptography system given 0, 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 optimally spaced 
relays.  Good agreement can be seen between the results of an exact numerical simulation 
(dots) and the approximate analytic results presented in the text (lines).  The results 
shown here correspond to a quantum relay efficiency of ½ and a detector dark count 
probability of 10-5. 
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FIG. 4. Plot of the normalized throughput Tn as a function of the range in dimensionless 
units (αx).   Tn is defined as the total throughput divided by the signal rate after 
attenuation (prior to error correction or privacy amplification).  The rapid drop in the 
efficiency of error correction and privacy amplification can be seen in all cases, but the 
use of quantum relays can extend the maximum range at which this occurs.  The total 
throughput still decreases exponentially, however.  The results shown here correspond to 
a quantum relay efficiency of ½ and a detector dark count probability of 10-5. 
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